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THE FORUM, CARLISLE, PA.

EDITORIAL.
THE FORUM of the Dickinson School
of Law with this issue bows to the public.
It comes not to revolutionize the periodicalsof collegiate circles, nor to dim the
light of any journal which may be shining in the legal world. The purpose of
THE FORUM is both general and specificgeneral in the sense that through its
medium well established principles of
law will be adduced and treated in the reports of moot court cases, and specific in
that primarily it will be devoted to the
Dicekinson School of Law. From time to
time also, there will be discussions of legal
questions and contributions by well-known
writers.
The student body unanimously believed
that a journal such as THE FORUM would
be helpful to themselves and would subserve the interests of the school. This
view was shared by Dean Trickett, and
resultant from conferences has come the
monthly FORUM. Each number will contain reports of the month's moot court
cases, in which there willbethestatement
of facts, the briefs of the counsel and the
opinion of the presiding judge. In addition, there will be interesting notes of the
school happenings and personal mention
of the alumni. The editors are especially
desirous that the graduates of the school
send personal notes. This is to be a feature of each issue and the members of the
previous classes can, through TH FORUM,

keep in touch with each other and informed of their life and work in the profession. Newspaper notices or contributed
notes are earnestly desired, and each
alumnus is asked to accept this message
as a personal request to furnish the editors
with such notices. We wish to lay special
emphasis on this request and sincerely
hope that it will not be disregarded.
In brief, we have outlined the purpose
of THE FORUM. While we feel that a certain amount of pride may be taken in
Volume I, Number 1, yet we promise better thingsin the future when thejournal becomes more firmly established. The cooperation of the incorporators and of the
alumni of the school with the student body
is earnestly desired. The future is radiant
with bright promises for THE FORUM as a
legal monthly of the Dickinson School of
Law.
IN another column will be found a brief
report of the splendid address given by
Hon. Robert Snodgrass, of Harrisburg, on
Monday evening, December 7th. Mr.
Snodgrass is one of the most eminent members of the Dauphin county bar. His address at the school was masterful and interesting in the highest degree. He
clothed his thoughts in a fine rhetorical
garb, and delivered them with clearness
and emphasis. The student body thoroughly appreciated the address, and manifested their feelings by an unanimous vote
of thmxiks to Mr. Snodgras.,
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THE ALUMNI.
J. Banks Kurtz, Esq., of the elass of '93,
has become a prominent lawyer of Altoona.
In addition to having acquired a good
practice, he has been honored in Republican politics. Last September, he was
married to Miss Jennie Stockton, of Washington county.
W. J. Schaefrer, Esq., a graduate of the
College and the Law School, has apleasant
home at 1606 Park avenue, Philadelphia,
and his office is at Broad and Arch streets.

William H. Walker, Esq., oftheclass of
'96, has become associated with D. F. Fortney, Esq., of Bellefonte, under the firm
name of Fortney & Walker. Mr. Walker
wasadmitted to the bar on July 20th, last,
and he has already had considerable success.
Albert S. Heck, Esq., of the
wh6 is located at Coudersport,
Attorney of Potter county.
has had splendid success ever
ing Dickinson.

class of'92,
is District
Air. Heck
since leav-

Hugh Gallagher, '96, has opened an
office in McAdoo, Schuylkill county, and is
reported to be doing well.
Win. F. Shean, '96, was admitted to the
Lackawanna bar, September 14th, on
motion of Judge Knapp. His prospects
are good. He was the guest of Dr. Trickett during Christmas week, in Carlisle.
His office is Room 701 Mears Building,
Scranton.
John Menovsky, Esq., who attended the
Law School in '94, is now practicing in
Wilkes-Barre. He has already been engaged in a number of important cases, and
is acquiring an extensive practice.
J. Wilmer Fisher, '96, was admitted to
tWie Berks county bar, November 4, 1896,
after being subjected to a thorough examination. He was highly complimented
by the Board of Examiners upon the excellence of his work. His office is located
at 29 North 6th Street, Reading, Pa.

S. A. Soult, Esq., of the class of '94, is
one of the prominent young members of
the Northumberland bar. He is located
in Shamokin, where lie has a comfortably
furnished suite of rooms on Independence
street. On October 28th, last, he took
unto himself a wife. He is entitled to
double congratulations-on his law success, and ol his marriage.
Joseph Frey Gilroy, of the class of '96,
who located in Williamsport, has moved
to Scranton, where lie is acquiring a good
practice.
John F. L. Morris, '94, has, since graduation been with Ginn & Co., publishers.
He visited Carlisle for a few hours during
the third week of December. He gives a
cheerful report of himself. His address is
70 Fifth Avenue, New York.
T. P. Dufl'v, Esq., a member of the class
of '96, has already become prominent in
the criminal court of Lackawanna county,
and has won many of his cases. Mr.
Duffy was formerly a reporter on the
Scranton Republican, and he has a wide
circle of friends and acquaintances in
Scranton.
John R. Henninger, of the class of '96,
has been in Lytton, Randolph county,
North Carolina, for several weeks. He is
therein the interests of a client, looking
after the latter's share in a gold mine.
Bruce H. Campbell, '96, recently accepted a most desirable position in the
office of the counsel to the corporation of
the City of Chicago.
Preston A. Vought, of the class of '94,
is a member of Northumberland county
bar. He is in partnership with L. S.
Walter, Esq., an experienced practitioner
with offices located at Mt. Carmel. Mir.
Vought has become very popular in Mt.
Carmel and is quite well known throughout the entire county.
Edmund J. Bennett, '96, has settled at
and is practicing at Lansdale, Montgomery
county. He was in an office at Doylestown for some time.
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HUGH C. DOUGHERTY.
Already the school has had occasion to
regret the death of two of those who have
been on its rolls as students. Wilson F.
Randolph of the class of '96, died during
the summer vacation of 1895, much
lamented by his class-mates and preceptors. Less than three months after graduation, Hugh C. Dougherty, of the same
class, was carried away.
Born in Tamaqua, 1865, Mr. Dougherty
attended the public schools until he was
ten years of age. He then worked in the
mines uhtil 1888. From that year until
1892 he was an agent for sewing machine
companies. Eager to gain a preparation
for a profession, he then attended St. Vincent's College, and the Lock Haven State
Normal School, graduating from the last
named institution in 1894. In June, of
1894, he entered the Dickinson School of
Law; whence he graduated on June 8th,
1896. For some time before the close of
his school course, his health had given
signs of serious impairment. He however
continued his application to study with
the severe and unintermittent assiduity
that he had always exhibited until the end.
He was advised by the Dean, but only
with much persuasion was induced, to
forego the final examinations, and to go
to his home. His absence thus occasioned,
was a painful feature of Comnnencement
Day. Some time afterwards, he went to
the Pennsylvania Hospital, in Philadelphia, where, on September 1, 1896, he
died, apparently from pneumonia.
Mr. Dougherty was as a student, diligent in the highest degree. He thought
well. His opinions were formed by careful and cautious investigation and reflection. He was kind, courteous, conscientious and pious, and his death is lamented
by the entire body of students.

THE SCHOOL.
The Dickinson Law Society, at a regular meeting on December 11th, elected the
following officers: President, Edmund L.
Ryan; Vice-president, Martin F. Duffy;
Secretary, Thomas B. Peffer; Treasurer,
J. Austin Sullivan; Sheriff, i. R. Herr;
Prothonotary, Warren H. Smock; Register, J. Thompson Caldwell; Recorder,

Robert Stucker; District-Attorney, Fred.
C. Miller; Justice-of-the-Peace, Walter
G. Treibly; Sergeant-at-Arms, George T.
Brown. The society has adopted the following resolutions on the death of Hugh
C. Dougherty :
WHEREAS, We the members of the
Dickinson Law Society of the Dickinson
School of Law, have learned with deep
sorrow of the death of-Hugh C. Dougherty,
of the class of '96, and,
WHEREAS, By his death the society has
lost one of its most faithful members, and
his associates a kind and sympathetic
friend, therefore be it,
Resolved, That we as a Society hereby
testify to his earnestness as a society
worker, to his ability as a student, and to
his qualities as a man.
.Resolved, That we extend our sincere
sympathy to his family in their bereavement.
Re.solved, That these resolutions be
spread upon the minutes of the Society,
and that a copy of them be forwarded to
the family of the deceased.
H.

S.

KiSER,

S. P. NORTHRUP,
J. E. SMALL,
Committee.
At a regular meeting of the Allison Law
Society on Wednesday evening, December 16th, the following officers were
elected: President, Paul H. Price; Vicepresident, Julian C. Walker; Secretary,
G.
Daniels; Treasurer, E.
Chas. E.
Hutchinson; Prothonotary, H. H. Hess;
District-Attorney, E. S. Livingood; Slierif,
J. A. Haas; Justice of the Peace,
Charles E. Horn; Auditors, Frank Wetzel, C. N. 'Berntheizel; Executive Committee, Herman Griswold, Frank Wetzel,
and Charles Shalters.
A large number of improvements were
made to the Law School building during
the summer vacation. The library, which
previously had taken up considerable space
in the main recitation hall, was removed
to room No. 1, which is now used solely
for reading purposes. Judging from the
increased use of the library, the change
has met with universal apI)roval on the
part of the students. The inain recitation
room was newly furnished together with
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all the other rooms in the school. Cloak
and toilet rooms have also been added.
The large audience hall on the second
floor, in which the college chapel services
were held years ago, was partitioned off
into one large lecture hall and three rooms,
one of the latter of which will be used by
Dean Trickett as an office during the present year. The walls in all the rooms have
been handsomely papered and the floors
furnished with heavy matting and linoleum. Taken all in all, the Dickinson
School of Law is now as well housed as
any other institution we know of, and
with these additional conveniences and
improvements, the school will undoubtedly make even more progress than it has
in the past.
CHIEF JUSTICE LORE.
Ion. Charles B. Lore, Chief Justice of
Delaware, will deliver the baccalaureate
address at the next commencement of the
Law school.
A descendant of an immigrant who settled in Cumberland County, Pa., in the
17th century, Mr. Lore was born in
Odessa, New Castle county, Del., March
16, 1831. Entering Dickinson College in
1848, he graduated with the honors of the
class in 1852, being the valedictorian.
Immediately thereafter, he commenced
to study law with Judge John K. Findley,
of Philadelphia. Some time after, he became clerk of the House of Representatives of his native state. On the close of
the term of that House, he for one year
preached under the auspices of the Philadelphia Conference, and during that short
timeacquired fame as a speakerand scholar.
He then resumed the study of law with
Daniel M. Baker, Chancellor of Delaware,
and was admitted to the bar in 1861. In 1862
he was commissioned to draft troops for
the Union army. In 1869 Gov. Saulsbury
appointed him Attorney General for the
term of five years. One of the important
cases prosecuted by him as such, was that
against Isaac C. West, a graduate of the
class of 1868, of Dickinson College, for the
murder of a negro at Dover.
In 1882, and in 1884, he was elected to
Congress. In 1885, on the resignation of
the office of Senator by Mr. Bayard, Mr.
Lore was defeated by but one majority for
the succession. Upon the death of Chief

Justice Robinson, in 1894, Governor Reynolds appointed him to that office. He
has already won fame as a Judge, by the
justness, learning, and promptness of his
decisions. In June 1896, Dickinson College, his Alma Mater, conferred upon him
the degree of LL. D.
BACCALAUREATE ORATOR FOR
1898.
Hon. William B. Hornblower, of New
York City, has agreed to deliver the
Baccalaureate Address before the class
graduating in 1898. Mr. Hornblower is an
Alumnus of Princeton University, whence
he graduated in 1871, along with several
other gentlemen who have since became
distinguished. In 1875 he finished a course
of law at the Columbia Law School, receiving the degree of LL. B. and in June
of that year, he was admitted to the bar of
the State of New York. Some years ago,
the Governor of that State appointed him
a Commissioner to revise the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution. In 1894, President Cleveland selected him to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, but his confirmation was
thwarted for personal and political reasons
by David B. Hill. Mr. Hornblower is
one of the most active and able of the bar
of the City of New York, the ablest in the
United States, if not in the world. Besides
his unquestioned eminence as advocate
and counsellor, he is distinguished for
literary taste and skill, and for oratorical
power.

LECTURE BY HON. ROBERT
SNODGRASS.
On the 7th of December, according to
announcement, Hon. Robert Snodgrass,
of Harrisburg, delivered his lecture to the
Dickinson law students, on the "Origin
and Development of Equity and Equity
Procedure."
The lecturer at the outset disclaimed
any intention to instruct the students upon
Equity principles, and accordingly confined himself to an historical sketch, which
had for its purpose, the stimulation of an
interest in the general subject of Equity,
prefacing his remarks by referring to the
tendency on the part of students as well
as lawyers to give precedence in their
studies to the "Law" as distinguished
from "Equity."
As indicating the origin of Equity Ju-
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risprudence, he referred to the Court of the
Praetor under the Roman system, showing
the striking similarity between that system and the modern English Court of
Equity and referring to the analogies between the two systems. He also pointed
out the differences which existed in the
manner of administering Equity. Whilst
in England the two systems of Equity and
Law were kept entirely separate, and required two distinct tribunals for the application of the remedies peculiar to each,
the Roman system of Equity was administered not as a separate department, but
as a part of the old Civil Law, and thus
accomplished the same results, as have
been accomplished in Pennsylvania, by its
peculiar system of administering Equity
through proceedings at law. The necessity,
therefore, of studying and trachig the
Equity system from its beginning, as found
in the Roman Jurisprudence, was particularly enforced.
The Lecturer then took up the office of
Chancellor under the English system.
This office, he showed, was of very ancient
origin. It had existed in England before
the Conquest, and was continued by William the Conqueror and his successors, as
a part of the royal establishment. He
also referred to the important functions
with which the Chancellor was invested,
showing by historical references how the
comparatively subordinate oftice of Clerk
or Secretary to the King, finally became
the highest judicial functionary of Great
Britain.
The position of the Chancellor, however,
was, for a long time, only an office. It
took a long period to develop it into a
Court, with the important functions which
subsequently belonged to it. Hisjurisdiction originally was Civil, rather than
Equitable, and it was not until the dissolution of the aularegia,in the reign of
King John, and the formation of the
courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas
and Exchequer, that the Court of Chancery, with the Lord Chancellor as presiding Justice, became fully established. In
the early times, petitions, which had
usually been presented to the'King in Parliament or to the King in Council, and
then referred to the Chancellor, came to be
presented directly to the Chancellor, who
applied an adequate remedy by ordering
the defendant to do, and compelling him
to do, what he considered right in Equity
and good conscience. From this beginning the Chancery procedure gradually
developed with such forms as were, from
time to time, suggested or advised by the
Chancellors. In the reign of Richard II,
the subpoena was invented, bills and
answers were introduced, and some form
and order given to the proceedings. As
time went on, however, the proceedings
became cumbersome and prolix, as all
pleadings were required to be in the Latin
language, and solicitors seemed to direct
their efforts more to the length of their

papers, than to arriving at correct results.
One interesting case was related, where a
replication had covered six score sheets of
paper, which the then Chancellor, Lord
Ellesmere, regarded as a serious oftfnse
and inflicted summary punishment upon
the solicitor.
The evils resulting from prolixity became so great that in the reign of Charles
the First, radical measures were adopted
to put a stop to the practice, and it is curious to note that Lord Coventry, who was
then Chancellor, in adopting a series of
rules for the government of Equity procedure, substantially formulated the same
rule, with reference to prolixity, which
now prevails in Pennsylvania.
Leaving the Lord Chancellor and his
Court, the lecturer then proceded to trace
the origin of Equity procedure in our own
state. In this connection, he indicated
the difference in the procedure prevailing
in the various states, and suggested the
Pennsylvania system as approximating,
if not reaching, the highest development of
remedial justice whereby Equity, whilst
administered through Common Law proceedings, still preserves its specialjurisdiction under the Acts of Assembly to which
he referred, particularly the Act of June
16, 1836. The several subjects of jurisdiction were pointed out, especially those
relating to corporations, injunctions and
trusts.
In connection with the remedy by injunction, he referred to .the memorable
contest between Lord Coke, Chief Justice
of England and Lord Ellesmere, who was
a Chancellor in the reign of James I, involving the power of a Court of Equity to
stay by injunction judgments at law. 'This
interesting contest, which was carried on
with great bitterness, finally resulted in a
victory for the Lord Chancellor, and the
jurisdiction of the Court of Equity on that
subject was effectually settled.
He also referred to the Equity rules
established, by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, under which, for nearly
thirty years, Equity proceedings have
been conducted. Following the history
down, particular reference was also made
to the amended rules of 1894, by which
the office of" Examiner to take testimony"
and "M~asters in Chancery," were abolished, and provision made for a hearing
of all cases before the Judge sitting as
Chancellor or before a referee to be selected
by the parties, the hearingto be conducted
in all respects as a trial at law is now conducted.
The reduction of the Equity procedure
to the simple forms provided for by these
rules, so far as the procedure is concerned,
brought the Courts of Law and Courts of
Equity more closely together, and still
further emphasized the practice of administering Equity through common law
proceedings in Pennsylvania.
It was pointed out that by skillfully
blending the Equitable with the legal, a
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system of jurisprudence had been constructed wherein the measure of right did
not depend upon the jurisdiction to which
the application for redress was made, but
upon the inherentjustice of the application
itself.
It was also shown that whilst the procedurein Equity and atLaw had thus become
so thoroughly assimilated, the distinction
between Law and Equity had not disappeared and that the Court of Equity still
maintained its separate and distinct jurisdiction, and was still open for the administration of justice, in cases falling within
that special jurisdiction, which, notwithstanding the apparently fixed limits, established by statute, was a constantly expanding and growing jurisdiction. This
was particularly enforced with respect to
corporations which are peculiarly within
the supervision and control of Equity in
Pennsylvania.
A thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the whole Equity system not only
in its origin but in its history and development, was therefore of the utmost import
ance to the student, in order to enable
him to grapple with the novel questions
which are sure to arise, under the ever
changing conditions of modern civilization.
The lecturer closed his address by urging upon the student to give at least as
much attention and study to the department of "Equity" as to that of "Law,"
and in doing so to bring himself into the
mental aptitude described by Lord Coke,
by which the student is urged to know the
reason of the law as well as the law itself
and so to make what he reads and studies
his own, "for" said the great Jurist,
"though a man can tell the law, yet if he
knows not the reason thereof, he will soon
forget his superficial knowledge and when
he findeth the right reason of the law and
so bringeth it to his natural reason that
he comprehendeth it as his own, this will
not only serve him for the understanding
of the case, but of many others, and this
knowledge will remain long with him."

THE MOOT COURT.
- EXCEPTIONS TO ACCOUNT OF
ABRAM THOMAS, GUARDIAN.
Of his grand-daughter, Sarah Thomas,
daughter of his deceased son, Henry
Thomas, Abram Thomas was appointed
the guardian. He continued to be such
for 16 years till Sarah reached majority,
and then filed an account for the entire
period of the guardianship. During all
this time, Sarah had resided in the family
of her grandfather, Abram Thomas, who
treated her as his own child, furnishing
her clothing, food, medical attendance,
schooling, a home, and preserving no
charges in books or elsewhere, for outlays

made on her account. He had indeed,
during this time, not intended to charge
her anything. On her reaching age, Sarah
married against the will of her grandfather, who thereupon determined to
charge her for the expenses he had incurred for her. In his account he asked a
credit for $1600 for clothing, food, house,
medical attendance and schooling, of the
ward. She excepted. The auditor surcharged the guardian, Abram Thomas,
with the $1600, no other facts appe.rmng
than those stated. To his report, exception
to the Orphans' Court.
E. L. RYAN and GEo. B. SOMERVILLE
for exceptant.
A guardian is entitled to credit for the
expenses of maintenance and education of
his ward.-Smith's Appeal, 30 Pa. 397;
Shollenberger's Appeal, 21 Pa. 337; Wall's
Estate, 13 Pa. C. C. 413; Jetter's Estate, 14
Phila. 319; Sharpe's Estate, 2 Phila. 280;
May vs. May, 109 Mass. 2.52; Amer. and
Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. 9, p. 267.
A gratuitous remark by a guardian that
he would not charge for support, etc., is
without a consideration and therefore not
obligatory upon him.-Keith vs. Miles, 39
Miss. 442; Cunningham vs. Pool, 9 Ala.
615; Allsop vs. Barbee, 14 T. B. Mon.
(Ky.) 526.
WILLIS E. MACKEY and H. S. KISER
for ward.
The close relationship between the guardian and the ward, coupled with the fact
that the guardian intended to furnish support, etc., gratuitously prevents his claim
from being sustained.-Douglas' Appeal,
82 Pa. 169; Horton's Appeal, 94 Pa. 62;
Duffy vs. Duffy, 44 Pa. 399; Ruckman's
Appeal, 61 Pa. 2,31; Smith vs. Milligan, 43
Pa. 107; Shuey's Estate, 1 Pa. Super. Ct.
405.
The guardian having kept no account,
his claim should be refused.-Miller's Estate, 6 Kulp 63; Haviland's Appeal, 8
Atlan. 858.
OPINION OF COURT.

That Abram Thomas was not entitled
to compensation for the expenses incurred
in behalf of his grand-daugater, Sarah
Thomas, is, we think, clear.
She lived with him for 16 years. He
treated her as his own child, furnishing
her clothing, food, medical attendance,
schooling, etc. Whether or not the circumstance that Abram was grandfather to
Sarah would be sufficient to rebut the presumption that he expected to be paid out
of her estate, the relation not being that
of parent and child; Horton's Ap., 94 Pa.
62, it would facilitate the, belief, that he
did not expect to be paid. Id., Smith vsMilligan, 43 Pa. 107. It is however made
expressly to appear, that he did not intend
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to charge her anything, and in conformity
with this intention, he kept no memoranda of expenditures made for her. We
think it needs no citation of authority to
establish the proposition that, if any one
relative or stranger, furnishes clothing,
food, etc., to another gratuitously, the
gift cannot as the result of a subsequent
change of feeling, be converted into a debt.
What is once a gratuity, forever remains a
gratuity. The consequences would be deplorable, if after services have been rendered, or money or chattels given to one out
of affection, friendship, gratitude or other
duty towards him, the donor could in consequence of a revolution of sentiment,
transform them into sources of indebtedness.
While the mere fact that the
ward was maintained in the family of the
guardian, would not negative his claim to
compensation, Jetter's Estate, 14 Phila.
319; even though the guardian was grandfather, Wall's Estate, 13 Pa. C. C. 413, (but
see Douglas' Ap. 82 Pa. 169); the intention
of the grandfather, shown by the keeping
of no charges for 16 years, and manifest
from other facts, not to ask compensation
from the ward's estate, precludes his now
obtaining any. Horton's Appeal, 94 Pa.
62; Shuey'sEstate,1 Super. Ct. 405; Beam's
Appeal, 96 Pa. 74.
We think also that the neglect to keep
accountof the expenditures would require a
refusal of the present claim of the guardian.
Miller's Estate, 6 Kulp 63. He should be
able to furnish evidence from which with
reasonable precision and confidence the
amount of his outlays for his ward might
be ascertained.
The exceptions must therefore be dismissed, and the decree recommended by
the Auditor, made.
JOHN APPLEGATE vs. AMOS WORTHINGTON.
John Applegate, a merchant in New
York, through a salesman, exhibited to
John Griffith, a merchant in 'Mechanicsburg, certain samples of dry goods, and

Griffith ordered $370 wvorth of goods by
these samples, on Dec. 7th, 1895.
The order was transmitted to New York,
but for some reason Applegate did not act
on it until April lth, 1896, when he put
the goods on the car at N. Y., consigned
to Griffith, who was to pay, and subsequently did pay, the freight and receive
the goods April 17th. On the 7th Dec.,
1895, Griffith was solvent, but became in-

solvent before April l1th, and he was
a.ware of this insolvency on that day.
Applegate knew nothing of his financial
condition when he shippedl the goods, but
learning of it five days afterward, notified
Griffith that he rescinded the sale, and reclaimed the goods. Meantime Griffith for
a debt existing before Dec. 7th, 1895, confessed a judgment to Lewis Simpson, who
issuing an execution, caused a sheriff's
sale of the goods, at which sale Amos
Worthington became the purchaser. At
the sale, notice on behalf of Applegate was
read, that Applegate claimed the goods.
At the trial of the replevin, Applegate
requested the Court to tell the jury that,
if the facts as stated above should be found
by them to exist, he was entitled to the
goods.
H. W. SAVIDGE and HUGH R. MILLER
fbr the plaintiff.
Fraud in contracts can be proved inductively, and in this instance it is proved
from the fact that Griffith received the
goods when he knew that he could not pay
for them.-1 Wharton on Contracts, 239.
A contract can be rescinded within a reasonable time by a party who claims to be
defrauded by its operation.-1 Wharton on
284. The defendant, at the
Contracts,
sale, acquired only what right and interest
Griffith had in the goods, and as the latter
had no interest in them whatever, the defendant likewise could have none.-Am.
& Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 22, p. 627; Kline
v. Bowman, 19 Pa. 28.
The notice at the sheriff's sale bound the
defendant to investigate Griffith's title to
thegoods, and be responsible for the true
condition of affairs.-Ferguson v. Rafferty,
128 Pa. 338.
Bringing the action in replevin is sustained by Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, vol.
20, p. 1065.
THos. K. LEIDY and ALFRED J. FEIGHT
for the defendant.
When there is a contract for the sale and
delivery of goods, the title passes from the
vendor to the vendee, from the moment
the goods are delivered to the carrier.Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 21, p.
496; P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Wireman, 88 Pa.
264; Summeril v. Elder, 1 Binn. 106; Bacharach & Co. v. Chester Frt. Line, 133 Pa.
414; Griffith v. Ingledew, 6 S. & R. 429.
To enable him to rescind the contract,
the plaintiff must prove that the sale was
eff eted by the vendee through collusion,
trick, artifice or false pretence.-Rodman
v. Thalheimer, 75 Pa. 232; Smith v. Smith,
21 Pa. 367; Backentoss v. Speicher, 31 Pa.
326; Patten's Appeal, 45 Pa. 151. The
action of replevin does not lie. Plaintiff
must seek redress in some other action.Shipman on Pleading, p. 112.
CHARGE OF COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury: The title of
Worthington to the goods which are the
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subject of this action is that of Griffith.
We perceive nothing to impeach the title
of Griffith, as against Applegate except (1)
the fact that Griffith, though solvent on
Dec. 7th, 1895i had become before and was
insolvent on April 11th, 1896, when the
goods, ordered on Dec. 7th, were put on the
cars in N. Y. consigned to Griffith at Mechanicsburg, and the further fact that
Griffith knew, on April 11th and therefore
on April 17th (when he received the goods)
that he was insolvent; (2) the interval of
time between the giving of the order, Dec.
7th, 1895, and the acceptance of it, April
11th, 1896.
(1). What then, is the effect of the insolvency?
By the law of Pennsylvania, a purchase
is not vitiated, by the fact that the vendee is insolvent, knows that he is insolvent,
and intends not to pay for the goods.
Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367; Backintoss v.
Speicher, 31 Pa. 324; Weisels v. Weiss, 156
Pa. 591; Perlman v. Sartorius, 162 Pa. 320.
This rule, though vigorously criticised by
Mitchell, J., in Bughman v. Central Bank,
159 Pa. 94, has not been discarded. It is
true that the use of any trick or artifice
adopted to impose on the vendor, will
in conjunction with the insolvency, render the sale voidable. A representation
to vendor by vendee of his solvency
will produce this result. Cincinnatti CooIn
perage Co. v. Gaul, 170 Pa. 445.
Bughman v. Central Bk. supra, it is
held that the doing of an act on the day
of or soon after the purchase, which destroys the capacity of the purchaser to pay
e. g. confessing a judgment and delivering
to plaintiff therein a bill of sale of all the
property embarked in the purchaser's business, will make the sale voidable, though
it is difficult to see how an already existing
insolvency when the purchase is made,
should have less serious consequences than
an insolvency arising at or after the purclase. At all events, as the law now is in
Pennsmylvania, much as we may be dissatisfied with it, the facts disclosed do not
make Applegate's sale to Griffith voidable
for.fraud.
Are we, however, to be governed by the
law of Pennsylvania? If a contract arose
from the order of Dec. 7th, 1895, and the
acceptance of it, of April Ilth, 1896. when
the goods were put into the hands of a
common carrier for Griflith, the sale was

made and executed in New York. Perlman v. Sartorius, 162 Pa. 320; Lowrey v.
Ulmer, 1 Super. Ct. 425. And if so, the
New York law in regard to the validity of
the contract, and the power of the vendor
to avoid it on account of fraud would be
likewise applicable, 162 Pa. 320; 1 Super.
Ct. 425.
The court, however, does not take notice
of a foreign law until it is proven, but will,
in the absence of evidence, assume that such
law corresponds with that of Pennsylvania.
As, under the Pennsylvania law, the goods
would not have been revocable by Applegate on account of the undisclosed insolvendy of Griffith, the condition of the
evidence obliges us to decide that the title
of Griffith was, as respects Applegate, indefeasible if a contract of sale took place.
(2). Did a contract of sale take place?
The order was an offer to take the goods
at the specified prices. It was made on
Dec. 7th, 1895. It designated no time in
which it was to be accepted ahd the goods
were to be sent. The acceptance must
therefore have taken place within a reasonable time. If an offer to buy goods is
sent to a merchant, he cannot ruminate
upon it for a year, or six months, or any
other long time, unless the offerer grants
him so long thne; or in view of the usage
of trade or the subject matter of the offer,
such time is reasonable. We are constrained to think that the four months
elapsing before the acceptance by Applegate were too long a period. Two days on a
sale of .iron were too long in Averill v.
Hedge, 12 Conn. 424; four months too long
on contract to carry iron for plaintiff in
Chicago &. G. E. R. R. Co. v. Dane, 43 N.
Y. 240. The offer of Griffith must be regarded as having lapsed, He could have
declined to receive the goods on Apr. 17th,
1896, when they came to him. If that is
so, the transmission of the goods to him,
was only an offer on Applegate's part, and
no contract arose, until the goods were accepted. Before the goods were accepted,
Applegate had the power to revoke the
offer. This he could do, by notifying
Griffith of such revocation. Was there
such not'ice before Griffith's acceptance?
The evidence is that Applegate, five days
after he shipped the goods, notified Griffith that he reclaimed them. This, we
think, though not inform a notice of revocation of an offer, is the equivalent, It,
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apprised Griffith that Applegate was not
willing that the goods should become his.
The notice therefore having reached
Griffith before, by his acceptance of the
tendered goods, he had concluded a contract, he was no longer in a position to
conclude such a contract.
Hence, as no sale took place, but only a
revoked offer by Applegate to sell, no title
passed to Griffith. Authority is unnecessary that, if Griffith had no ownership,
none passed to Worthington.
The goods being Applegate's, and he
having a right to the immediate possession of them, replevin is the proper remedy.
Cincinnati Cooperage Co. v. Gaul, 170 Pa.
545.
We therefore instruct you, gentlemen of
the jury, that if you find the facts to be as
they are assumed to be in the point of
the plaintiff, he is entitled to the goods.
THOMAS SALTER vs. LOWRIE
LLEWELLYN.
David Wright applied to Llewellyn to
make him a note for $500 for his (Wright's)
accommodation, and a note was drawn up
reading thus, the body of it being written
by Wright.
SHIPPENSBURG, August 3d, 1896.
Six months after date, I promise to pay
to the order of David Wright five hundred
dollars without defalcation, value received.
LOW=xE LLEWELLYN.

David Wright on the same day wrote
another note for the same amount and on
the same terms, and without Llewellyn's
consent or knowledge, signed his name to
it. The forgery was very expertly done,
so that without rather close examination,
it could not have been detected. Two
days afterwards, in the presence of Llewellyn, Wright asked Salter to discount
him a note for $500, reading the second
above described note. Llewellyn not
looking narrowly at the note expressed the
hope that Salter would accommodate
Wright. Salter said he would consider.
After some reflection, Salter on the same
day, but not in the presence of Llewellyn,
informed Wright that he would buy the
note, and paid $500 less the discount. At
maturity the note remained unpaid. The
note first described, had been endorsed
to Parker Jones and Llewellyn, on discovering it in Jones' hands, had paid it,
immediately notifying Salter that the
note in his hands was forged.
JOHN E. SMALL and J. H. WILLAMS
for plaintiff.
The defendant is estopped from denying
that he is liable, after impliedly representing that the note is genuine, and inducing

the plaintiff to discount it.-Cohen v.
Teller, 93 Pa. 123; Zell's Appeal, 103 Pa.
344; Brooke v. Harman, 9 W. N. C. 462.
The rule of law is well settled that
where one of two innocent parties must
suffer a loss, such loss must be borne by
the party whose neglect was the occasion
of it.-AMiller v. Broarsky, 130 Pa. 372;
Shaw v. Levy. 17 S. & R. 99; Sinclair v.
Healy, 40 Pa. 417.
C. W. HAMILTON and JosEPx F. BIDDLE for defendant.
No contractual relation exists between
the parties. If there was a contract it is
void by reason of mistake.-Clark on Contracts, p. 291.
The statement of defendant was not
made with a knowledge of the facts. He
is therefore not liable.-Gettysburg Bank
v. Chrishohm, 169 Pa. 570; 11 Allen 349;
Tradesman Bank v.
Third National
Bank, 66 Pa. 436.
Defendant was not negligent.-Bigelow
on Torts, p. 287; Bigelow on Bills and
Notes, pp. 176, 287; MNerchants of the
Staple v. Bank of England, 21 Q. B. Div.
160; Bank of Irelandv. Evans's Charities,
5 H. L. Cas. 389.
Plaintiff was negligent in not making
inquiries.-Bigelow on Estoppel, 487, 5
ed.; Bank of United States v. Bank of
Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333; Iron City Nat.
Bank v. Fort Pitt National Bank, 159 Pa.
46.
Defendant is not liable, although his
acts or conduct may have been the occasion, if they were not the cause of the
loss.--Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 180.
OPINION OF COURT.
The signature of Llewellyn to the note
on which suit has been brought, was in
fact forged. Authority is unnecessary for
the principle that no liability arose on
Llewellyn's part, from the mere execution
of the note. If such liability has since
come into existence, it must be by the
conduct of Llewellyn alleged to have induced Salter's purchase of the note.
Despite some dicta to the effect that a
forgery cannot be ratified, we think there
can be no doubt that a forged note may be
made enforceable, by aots of the person
whose name is thereto forged, which
estop him from disputin.g its genuineness.
U. S. Bk. v. Bk. of Georgia, 10 Wheat.
340; Zell's Appeal, 103 Pa. 344; Horstiman
v. Henshaw, 11 How. 181; Koons v.
)avis, 84 Ind. 387; Brooke v. Harman,
') W. N. C. 462; Cohn v. Teller, 93 Pa. 123.
Do the acts of Llewellv estop himi?
We think they were fitted to convince
Salter that the note read to hini was
Llewellyn's, Llewellyn heard the note
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read, as his, "and expressed thehope that
Salter would accommodate Wright," the
payee. Only one inference could be drawn
by Salter from this, viz: that Llewellyn
admitted the note to be his.
It is true that Llewellyn was acting
under a deception practiced on him by
Wright. He was innocent of any intent
to impose on Salter. Nevertheless, his
conduct was adapted to induce Salter to
make no further inquiries concerning the
genuineness of the signature to it. Llewellyn's statement was made to induce
Salter to purchase the note. Salter did
purchase the note. But for Llewellyn's
intervention, the note would not have
been purchased at least without further
inquiry as to its execution. Although
Llewellyn acted in good faith, being himself imposed upon, Salter was not instrumental in this imposition, while Llewellyn
was in that practiced on Salter. We think
the principle is applicable that when one of
two innocent persons, A and B, must suffer,
B having by his acts led to the act of A that
would involve him in loss, if B were pernitted to show the fact to be different from
his allegation, the loss will be placed on
B. (See O'Connor v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318;
Miller v. Browarsky, 130 Pa. 372; Humphrey v. Tozier,154 Pa. 410, for recognition
of this principle.) 'I he case differs from
2nd Nat. Bk. v. Wentzel, 151 Pa.. 142,
where the purchaser of the note had already bought it before the estopping acts.
We are of the opinion therefore that the
acts shown require the judgment to be entered for the plaintiff.

ThOMAS O'BRIEN vs. SARAH ADAMS.

Josiah Adams, a merchant, desired to
make purchases ofgoods from O'Brien who
however declined to sell him anything
on credit, without additional seceurity.
Adams then obtained from his mother,
Sarah Adams (whose husband had been
for three years living apart from her,
without excuse furnished by her) the following letter:
MECHANICSBURG, October 7th, 1895.
I understand that my son desires to
make purchases of goods. This certifies
that I will be responsible to any one that
shall trust him to the amount of $350.
SARAH ADAMS.
Josiah showed this to Thomas O'Brien,
who, in reliance on it, and on a note at
thirty days of Josiah, let him have goods
to the value of $359.34. The note not be-

ing paid at maturity, the action was
brought against Saxali Adams.
GEo. T. BnowN and PAUL H. PRICE
for the plaintiff.
The Act of June 8th, 1893, which prevents a married woman from becoming
an accommodation endorser, guarantor or
surety for another, does not apply in this
case.
The fact that the defendant refuses to
state or give reasons for living apart from
her husband for a period of three years,
gives rise to the presumption that he deserted her de.facto, and henceshe is within.
the Act of 1855, and may be sued as a
feme sole.-Cases interpreting Act of 1855 :
Jacobs v. Featherstone, 6 W. & S. 349;
Ellison v. Anderson, 110 Pa. 486; Black v.
Tricker, 59 Pa. 13; Dawson v. Roney, 15
Phila. 92. Cases on desertion: A-er v.
Warren, 47 Maine 217; Gregory v. 1ierce,
4 Metcalf 478; Dean v. Richmond, 5 Pick.
461.
The case is one of suretyship.-Reigart
v. White, 52 Pa. 438; Watson v. Poyel,
1.58 Pa. 513; Gilbert v. Henck, 30 Pa. 20.5;
Ashton v. Bayard, 71 Pa. 109.
H. FRANKLIN KANTNER and SIvoN P.
NORTHRUP for the defendant.
A married woman, deserted by her husband, cannot bind herself as a feme sole
unless she be engaged in some trade, business or employment.--Eicholtz 'v.
IcCaughey, 1 Chester 18-5; Grosser v. Hornung, 10 W. N. C. 463.
Under the Act of 1718, extended by the
Act of 1855, the liability of a married
woman for her debts arises from her pursuing some business at which she works
for a livelihood.-Cleaver v. Sheetz, 70 Pa.
496; Black v. Tricker, 59 Pa. 13; Orrel v.
Van Gorder, 96 Pa. 180.
The Acts of June 3d, 1887, and June 8th,
1893, unfetter a married woman for three
purposes only: (1) Where she engages in
trade or business; (2) in the management
of her separate estate; (3) for necessaries.
But she cannot become surety or guarantor
for another.-R. E.. Investment Co. v.
Roop, 132 Pa 496; Patrick & Co. v. Smith,
165 Pa. 528; Weigle v. Mercer, 1 Pa. Super.
490.
The letter of the defendant, given in
evidence, was not a proposal to buy on
her own account, but an offer to guarantee
the purchase of her son. The plaintiff
has no right of action against the defendant until her son, the original debtor, has
been pursued to insolvency, and this not
having been established, the action must
fail. -Brown v. Brooks, 2.5 Pa. 212; Reynolds v. Reynolds. 16 S. & R. 81: Isett v.
Hoge, 2 Watts 128; Woods v. §herman,
17 Pa. 104.
OPINION OF COURT.

The analysis of this case by the learned
counsel needs no emendation. They have
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clearly apprehended and stated the decisive questions involved in it.
The contract is either one of guaranty or
of suretyship. It is necessary then to
ascertain whether a contract of either of
these classes can be made by this married
woman. Should her power to make it be
established, it will then be necessary to
determine whether it was one of guaranty.
That married women generally could
not contract at common law, is too trite a
principle to need vindication by authority.
If Sarah Adams possessed the power to
contract, she derived it either from the
act of June 8th, 1893, or from the previous
acts of February 22d, 1718, and May 4th,
1855.
The act of 1893, 2 P. & L. 2890, after empowering a married woman "to the same
extent as an unmarried person" to "make
any contract in writing or otherwise" etc.,
adds, "but she may not become accommodation indorser, maker, guarantor or
surety for another." Language so explicit
is in need of no interpretation. It is
manifest that Mrs. Adams' undertaking is
not primary but secondary; that it is
either a suretyship or a guaranty, and
that from the act of 1893 she obtained no
power to make it.
The act of May 4th, 1855, 2 P. &L. 2891,
confers on married women whose husbands shall neglect or refuse to provide
for them or shall desert them, the rights of
afeme sole trader as created by the act of
February 22d, 1718. It is distinctly held
by the courts that these rights as respects
contract, are bestowed only when the
contract occurs in the prosecution qf a
trade or business. Cleaver v. Scheetz, 70
Pa. 496; Bell v. Ladd, 8 V. N. C. 129.
In Koechling v. Henkel, 144 Pa. 215, it
seems to be assu ned that the power of a
ferne sole trader and the power conferred
by the act of 1893 are commensurate. As
the contract before us was not made in
the course of a trad by Mrs. Adams
(quod non apparet non cst ), nor for her
necessaries, she lacked the legal power to
make it.
The existence of the other condition of
the application of the act of 1772 is discoverable. Her husband had for three
years been living apart from her without
excuse furnished by her. This is a desertion, and if, in addition to desertion, his
failure to supply her with necessaries is

essential, we think that the failure might
primafacie be inferred from the desertion. Decision of this point is however
unnecessary.
The conclusion reached of a want of
contractual power in Mrs. Adams, renders
the consideration of the special nature of
the contract unnecessary. Despite the confusion in the reported cases we think the
contract here was one of suretyship. Mrs.
Adars, "will be responsible to any one
that shall trust" herson "to the amount of
$350." There is nothing, in this phrase
pointing to the insolvency of the son as a
condition of liability. In Watson v. Porzel, 158 Pa. 513, one of the plaintiff's witnesses stated that Kaiser (defendant) "said
he would be responsible for any goods Mr.
Miller ordered," and Kaiser was treated
as unconditionally liable. A different result was reached in Bickel v. Auer, 9
Phila. 499, chiefly on the supposed authority of Gilbertv. Henek, 30 Pa. 205. Of this
case Sharswood J. says in Ashton v.
Bayard, 71 Pa. 139: " There is nothing
to overrule in Gilbert v. Henck, but the
opinion expressed by Mr. C. J. Lowrie
an opinion which cannot stand the test of
comparison with Amsbaugh v. Gearhart
1 Jones 482," etc.
Judgment must be entered for the defendant non obstante veredicto.
AMOS HENDERSON vs. PA. MUT.
FIRE INS. CO.
Henderson had his house insured in the
defendant Company for $3000. The policy
contained the clause that if during the life
of the policy the risk should be increased
by any act whatsoever of Henderson, without tile written consent thereto of the
defendant, the policy should be void. Three
months after the issue of the policy, Henderson became surety in a bond for $1000
with warrant of attorney, conditioned for
the production of goods allowed by the
sheriff to remain in the hands of the principal obligor who was the defendant in an
execution, at any time the sheriff should
demand them for the purpose of selling
them. On the warrant, a judgment was
entered. The goods were four months
afterwards produced to the sheriff on his
demand. About three weeks after the
roduction of them, a fire occurred, wherey the house of Henderson was destroyed.
His loss exceeded $5000.
The only defense of the company is that
the policy had become void before the fire.
H. C. BEISTEL and HORACE CODINGTON

for plaintiff.
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In the interpretation of insurance policies, the intention of the parties should be
ascertained, and their rights as thus understood, enforced.-Stacey v. Insurance Co.,
2 W. & S. 506; Heffron v. Insurance Co.,
132 Pa. 580.
Conditions in a policy will not be extended by implication, but must be specifically set forth.-Rann v. Insurance Co.,
59 N. Y. 387.
A condition in a fire insurance policy to
the effect that, "if the risk be increased by
any act whatsoever the policy shall be
void," has no reference to a judgment upon
the property or to an execution upon that
judgment.-Collins v. London Assurance
Corporation, 165 Pa. 289; Powers v. Guardian Fire & Life Ins. CO., 136 Mass. 108.
I. I. WINGERT and R. H. BARKER for
defendant.
The parties stipulated for a particular
hazard at a particular rate. An increased
hazard, or change in the contract by the
insured without the consent of the insurer
makes the policy void.-Seybert v. Pa.
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Pa. 282; Manu;
facturer's and Merchant's Ins. Co. v.
Kunkle, 6 W. N. C. 234; Kennedy v. St.
Lawrence Fire Ins. Co., 10 Barb. 286;
Gottsman v. Pa. Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210; Fire
Association of Phila. v. Williamson, 26
Pa. 197; Bowditeh Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Winslow, 8 Gray 38.
It is immaterial that the judgment was
discharged before the fire. The increased
risk made the contract of insurance void,
and it was not revived when the risk was
removed.
OPINION OF COURT.

The policy stipulates that if during its
life, the risk shall be increased by any act
whatsoever of Henderson, without the
written consent of the company it shall
become void.
Is there evidence to submit to the jury,
that there has been such increase of risk?
The only circumstances alleged to constitute such increase, are that Henderson
became surety on a bond with warrant of
attorney, conditioned for the doing of an
act, that judgment was entered on this
warrant, and that the act was done one
month after the entry of the judgment,
whereby the judgment was discharged.
The fire did not occur during the existence
of this judgment.
Had the stipulation been against incumbrances by judgment, this judgment,
though conditional, and though it was
discharged by performance of the act
whose performance it was designed to secure, would have avoided the policy. Seybert v. Pa. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Pa. 282.

The clause in this policy concerns not
specifically incumbrances, but generically
the increase of risk. In a sense, anything that tends to diminish the vigilance
of the assured with respect to the protection of his property, increases the risk to
the company, and a mortgage orjudgment
attaching as a lien to the house, would have
this tendency. We are disposed to think
however in the absence of indication in the
policy that this species of increase of risk
was in the contemplation of the parties,
that the risk in view was such as springs
from a change in the structure or use of
the building. Collins v. London Assurance Corporation 165 Pa. 298. We could not
say as a matter of law that the confession
of judgment increased the risk, in the
sense of this policy, Powers v. Guardian
Fire & Life Ins. Co. 136 Mass. 108; nor do
we think that we should have been warranted in allowing the jury to say so as a
matter of fact.
Judgment is therefore entered on the
verdict.

JOHN HARPER vs. JA1ES GLENDON.
Harman Sebring applied to John Harper for a loan of $500. Harper agreed to
make it,on a note on which Glendon should
be endorser. A note was accordingly
drawn up, by Sebring, payable to Glendon, and endorsed by Glendon, whereon
Harper gave $500 to Sebring. The note,
which was for four months, became payable on April 7th, 1896. On the 23rd of
March, 1896, Sebring applied to Harper
for forbearance from demand, offering to
pay 7 per cent. interest for the time of
forbearance. Harper agreed, on Sebring's
promise to pay 7 per cent. to wait for "a
considerable time." Meanwhile, Harper,
who was agent for Sebring for the sale of
agricultural implements, from time to
time even after the note had fallen due,
received moneys for the implements sold
amounting in all to $1377, which he sent
to Sebring. Harper indulged Sebring for
two years and four months, when he
made a demand for payment. Sebring
being unable to pay any part of the note,
this suit was brought against Glendon,
who had waived protest and notice of nonpayment.
R. W. IRVING and HARVEY E. KNUPP
for the plaintiff.
A promise to pay usury in the future is
not a sufficient consideration upon which
to base an agreement for an extension of
time so as to relieve the surety.-Hartman
v. Danner 74 Pa. 36; Grayson's Appeal,
16 W. N. b. 388.
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'Money in the hands of an agent cannot
be applied to a note due him by the prin-

cipal on account of the existing fiduciary
relation. -Tagg v. Bowman, 99 Pa. 376;
108 Pa. 273.
When an endorser waives protest before
or at the day of maturity of a note he puts
himself in the same situation as if protest
had been made and proved, and he makes
himself absolutely liable to the holder.
Jenkin v. White, 147 Pa. 303; Scott v.
Greer, 10 Pa 103; McCamant v. Miner's
Trust Co., 15W. W. 0. 122.
If an indorser agrees to be absolutely
bound and to pay the note at maturity,
he is absolutely bound until relieved by
the Statute of Limitation.-Sieger v. Second
Nat. Bank, 132 Pa. 307.
The contract of indorsement means that
the indorser will pay on the single condition that the maker does not. Hence,
the liability of the endorser becomes fixed
the moment he is notified of non-payment
by the maker; and to the holder, it is that
of a principal.-McCamant v. Miner's
Trust Co., 15 V. N. C. 122.
HER-MAN H. GRISwoLD for the defendant.
The contract of an indorser is to pay a
note in case payment is demanded, and
the maker does not pay.-Juniata Bank, v.
Hale, 16 S & R. 160.
No demand appears to have been made
in this case, and as the indorser waived
"protest and notice," but not "demand,"
the neglect of the drawee is obvious. I
Woodw. 52.
Any alteration of the contract without
the consent of the surety, or any subsequent agreement, by which the rights of
the surety are prejudiced, discharges the
surety.-Fellows v. Prentiss, 3 Denio 521.
Misappropriating, misusing, or losing
any security or means of satisfying the
debt held by the creditor discharges the
surety and gives him a complete defense.
-Byles on Bills and Notes, p. 384; De
Colyar's Law of Guaranty Surety, and
Principal, p. 318; Bank of Gettysburg v.
Thompson, 3 Grant 117.
CHARGE OF COURT.

Gentlemen of the .Tury:
The defences of Glendon may be stated
to be (1) that Harper, the holder of the
note had moneys belonging to Sebring in
his hands, which lie might have applied
to this note and that, failing, so to do, he
has discharged Sebring's surety, Glendon;
(2) the agreement of Harper with Sebring
to give time to Sebring, without the consent of Glendon, a surety, has discharged
Glendon; (3) the failure of Harper to make
demand on Sebring, on the day of the
maturity of the note, has discharged
Glendon.

1. Harper as agent for the sale of agricultural implements for Sebring, obtained
$1377, which, instead of deducting therefrom the amount of the note $500, with"
interest, he sentfto Sebring.
No principle is better settled than that,
when a creditor has means of his principal
debtor under his control, and he does not
apply them to the discharge of the debt,
he discharges the suretypro tanto. Hutchison v. Woodwell, 107 Pa. 509; Templeton v. Shakley, 107 Pa. 370. Whether a
proper application of this principle, would
require the creditor who is indebted to the
principal debtor, to set off the debt of the
latter to him against his own indebtedness, it is unnecessary to determine, for,
the moneys in Harper's hands were there
in the capacity of agent, and he had therefore no right to retain them in order to
satisfy his own claim. Tagg v. Bowman,
99 Pa. 376; 108 Pa. 273. He was in no
default, therefore, as respects Glendon,
the surety, in not retaining the $1377.
2. The agreement to give time. There
are two reasons for the ineffectiveness of
this agreement with regard to the dissolution of the liability of the surety, Glendon.
(a) The agreement was not to forbear for
any definite time, but for a "considerable
time." People's Bank of Wilkes Barre v.
Legrand, 103 Pa. 309; Miller v. Stern, 2
Pa. 286. (b) There was no consideration
for the agreement to extend the time.
The promise to extend the same was
made to Sebring on his promise to pay 7
per cent. interest; i. e. one per cent. more
than the legal rate. Had the agreement to
pay 7 per cent. induced the original loan,
it could not for that reason be enforced.
Much less is there reason for enforcing
such an agreement, when it simply procures the creditor's consent to a forbearance from steps to recover the money. As
it cannot be enforced it does not constitute a consideration. Hartman v. Danner 74 Pa. 36.
3. Harper's failure to demand payment
of the note from Sebring on the day of its
maturity.
The holder of the note is normally
obliged to demand payment of the maker
at its maturity, as a condition precedent
to the duty. of the endorser to pay it. The
endorser however can enlarge his undertaking; can make himself liable whether
there is such demand of payment or not.
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Glendon has waived protest and notice of
non-payment. Is this to be understood
as a waiver of demand on the maker? We
think it is. Annville Nat. Bank v. Kettering, 106 Pa. 531; Scott v. Greer, 10 Pa.
103. Of the words "protest waived" says
Sterrett J. in 106 Pa. 531, "the weight of
both reason and authority is that they do
constitute a waiver of both": i. e. of
demand and notice.
As the execution of the endorsement by
Glendon is admitted, and none of the
defences urged by him are available in
law, we instruct you, gentlemen of the
jury, to render a verdict for the plaintiff.

AUGUSTUS TROUT vs. HENRY
MASON.
Against John Savage, who owned in fee
a tract of land, a j udgient was recovered
oil Aug. 7th, 1895, in the C. P. of the
county where the land is, for $329.34. - On
the judgment an execution issued which
produced a sheriff's sale of the land to
Henry Mason, on Feb. 3d, 1896. On Oct.
5th, 1895, John Savage delivered a deed for
the land to Charles ffiddle. The deed had
been written on the 10th July, 1895, with a
blank for the name of the grantee and bore
that date. It had also been acknowledged
on that day. The name of the grantee was
inserted Oct. 5th, 1895. On Jan. 9th, 1896,
Biddle conveyed the land to Augustus
Trout who had no knowledge that the
deed to Biddle had not been delivered on
the day of its date, before accepting it,
and paying the purchase money, consulted the records of deeds and found
there the deed to Biddle. Mason gained
possession of the land. Trout brings this
ejeetment to recover it.
JULIAN C. WALKER and J. P. COSTELLO
for the plaintiff.
In the absence of any evidence of fraud
on the part of the '.endee the conveyance
of Savage to Biddle, being for value, is a
good conveyance.-May on Fradulent Conveyances, p. 78; Reehling v. Byers, 94 Pa.
316; Scott v. Heilager, 14 Pa. 238.
The mere fact that the name of the grantee was not inserted in the deed, on July 10,
1895, the date of the deed would not destroy its validity. If the true party can
be ascertained the deed will be good.Tiedeman on Real Property,
p. 798; Ruckman v. Ruckman, 32 N. J. q. 259.
To affect lands in the hands of a purchaser, a judgment must have been entered
anterior to the conveyance.-Mechanics'
Bank v. Garman 8 W & S' 304.
The deed from Biddle to Trout conveyed
all rights and equities of the former, in and
to the land, to the latter. The certificate

of acknowledgment dated July 10th, 1895,
-over one month before the judgment
against Savage,-was legal evidence to
Trout of the execution of the deed on that
date.-Cover v. 'Manaway, 115 Pa. 338;
Heeter v. Glasgow, 79 Pa. 79; Williams &
Confer v. Baker, 71 Pa. 476.
A bonafidepurchaser for a valuable consideration is protected whether he purchased from a fraudulent grantor or a
fraudulent grantee.-Burger v. Rafferty,
100 Pa. 113; Jones v. Pierce, 134 Pa. 533;
Sellas v. McCarty, 10 Watts 29; Reehling
v. Byers, 94 Pa. 316.
GEO. W. BENEDICT, JR., and ANDREW
S. SIHcNER for the defendant.
The title which passed to Biddle, and
thence to Trout, subsequent to the entry
of the judgment, which produced the
sheriff's sale, was subject to that lien, and
the said sheriff's sale was valid.-Byrod's
Appeal, 31 Pa. 242.
Actual date of delivery controls the date
in the deed.-Tiedeman on Real Property,
p. 812; Geiss v. Odenheimer, 4 Yeates, 278;
McKinney v. Rhoads, 5 Watts 345.
A deed signed, sealed, acknowledged and
placed on record is of no effect as against
a purchaser from the grantor.
A deed executed, after judgment is entered, is no notice to a purchaser at
sheriff's sale.-Lance v. Gorman, 136 Pa.
208. It is the duty of a purchaser of land
to look for all liens which have been entered against the grantors.-Reck v. Clapp, 1
Penny. 339.
OPINION OF COURT.

Judgment was recovered against John
Savage on Aug. 7th, 1895. He then owned
a tract of land, and upon that land, the
judgment immediately became a lien.
This lien could not be dissolved by any act
of Savage. Hence, when he delivered a
deed for the land to Charles-Biddle, on Oct.
5th, 1895, Biddle acquired the land subject
to the judgment. Biddle was bound to
consult the records of the prothonotary's
office, or, rather, took the risk of the existence of such judgment liens as such an
examination would have revealed.
As the right of the purchaser at a
sheriff's sale on a judgment is at least as
good as that of the judgment creditor,
Mason, the sheriff's vendee, acquired a
title which would have superseded and
extinguished that of Biddle.
But, Biddle's deed, though delivered,
and become operative on Oct. 5th, 1895,
was dated 10 July. 1895. It had been
acknowledged also, on that day, as the
magistrate's certificate showed. This deed
was put on record before Jan. 9th, 1896, on
which day Biddle conveyed the land to
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Augustus Trout.

Trout consulted the

CHARLES CHANDLER vs. TYRONE

records, and there found the transcript of a
PASSENGER RY. CO.
deed from Savage to Biddle, of the date of
Chandler boarded a car of the defendant.
10 July, 1895, with a magistmte's certificate
of the same day. When he consulted the The car was "bobtailed," i. e., had a driver
but no conductor, passengers depositing
Judgment Index he found the judgment
their fares in a cash box at the front end
against Savage to have been recovered on
of the car. It was drawn by two horses.
When Chandler got on, the interior of the
Aug. 7th, 1895, nearly a month after the
car was crowded and he was obliged to
date of the deed, and he bought the land
remain on the rear platform, whicZi was
from Biddle thinking it was exempt from
also full of passengers. At a certain crossthe lien of that judgment.
ing, the bell rang and the car stopped to
allow
two ladies who were inside of the
In this ejectment wherein Trout seeks to
ear to alight. They came out, and Chandrecover the land from Mason, the sheriff's
ler and others stood back to permit them
vendee, the question is in substance
to dismount. Chandler who had intended
whether the creditor of Savage, with a
to get off at a point but a few rods farther
good lien, acquired on Aug. 7th, 1895, and ofi, followed the ladies, purposing to walk
the distance between that point and his
continuing until Jan. 9th, 1896, lost it on
destination. As he was in the act of dethat day by an act over which he had no
scending from the last step, holding on to
control, viz: the purchase of the land, in
the guard-rails with his hands, the driver
struck the horses a severe blow with his
ignorance of the facts, by Trout. The
whip. They jumped suddenly forward,
statement of the question instantly evokes
jerked Chandler's hold loose, *and threw
its answer. Savage's creditor was in no
hii violently to theground. Chandler had
default. He had done all required of him
drunk an intoxicant twice during the day,
and a witness for-the defendant testified
by law, in order both to acquire and mainthat lie thought him "pretty full."
tain his lien. He had acquired this lien
The Court charged the jury.
before Trout had gained any interest in the
1. If Chandler was underthe influence
land. If Trout has been misled, by the
of liquor, and this fact contributed to the
injury to any extent, by hindering or dedate in the recorded deed, and by the corlaying his gettinig oft; or lessening his cauresponding date of the acknowledgment,
tion or control of his. motions, lie cannot
the judgment creditor is not responsible
recover.
for the error. He took "the risk of having
2. Chandler, being on the platform
when the car stopped, he should have
the actual state of the title correspond to
alighted immediately, and if his injury
that which appears of record." Reck v.
would not have haplened had lie done so,
Clapp, 1 Penny, 339. The record can not
lie cannot recover.
improve the title conveyed by the recorded
3. If the car had stopped a reasonable
time to allow passengers to get off, the
dced. The utmost it can accomplish is
driver not knowing Chandler's desire to
to preserve the title made by the deed
get oft; and Chandler attempted to get off
from impairment by mortgages, convey- after the reasonable time
had elapsed, lie
ances, etc., made after its execution.
cannot recover.
Trout's title was affected by thefaets. The
4. If the injury to Chandler happened
while the driver was conducting his busiconveyance to Biddle being in fact after
ne-s in the ustial and ordinary way,
the recovery of the judgment, the circumChandler cannot recover.
stance that the deed to him was antedated
Verdict for defendant. Motion by plaintiff for a new trial.
could give neither him, nor anyone who
purchased froni him, after seeing this deed,
J. R. SMITIn and Gizo. B. SOUERVILsIF
fo~r lplaintiff.
or the record of it, any right which would
not have been acquired had the deed been
The respective parts of the Court's
correctly dated. Trout's inspection of the
charge were erroneous and misleading,
record of Biddle's deed is no more effectual,
therefore a new trial should be granted.
1. There was no evidence that the inthan the inspection of the deed itself.
toxication of Chandler, either delayed his
It follows that the title of Mason, relatgetting off the car or lessened his caution
ing back to the judgment, must prevail
or control of his motions. The true test
against thatof Trout which has its source
in this case is whether Chandler, though
at a date subsequent to that of the judgdrunk to the degree shown, used less caution and prudence than an ordinarily caument.
tious and prudent man.
Your verdict, therefore, gentlemen of
2. It cannot be laid down as law that
the jury, ought to be for the defendant.
when one upon a platform steps back to
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allow others to precede him, he, by so doing
is estopped from recovering. -Johnson
v. Railroad Co., 70 Pa. 357; Railroad Co.
v. Peters, 116 Pa. 206; 10 Mees. & Wels.
345; 5 Esp. N. P. 44.
3. The car must have stopped, not only
a reasonable length of time, but a sufficient
length of time.-Beatty v. Gihnore, 16 Pa.
463; Allen v. Willard 57 Pa. 379; Railroad
Co. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 359.
4. The last point in the judge's charge
is ambiguous, misleading.-Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa. 463.
A. A. WINGERT and H. S. KISER for
defendant, contended that the charge of
-the Court was not erroneous and cited the
following:
1. Alger v. City of Lowell, 85 Mass.
402; Linton v. City of Chester, 1 W. N. C.
192; Amer. and Eng. Encyclopvedia of
Law, Vol. 2, p. 751.
2. Reddington v. Traction Co., 132 Pa.
154; Monongahela City v. Fischer, 111 Pa.
9.
3. Wood's Railway Law, pp. 1128, 1148;
Patterson's Railway Accident Law, .258;
McClintock v. Railroad Co., 21 W. N. C.
133; Railroad v. Lyons, 129 Pa. 113; Nichols v. Railroad Co., 106 Mass. 463; Amer.
and Eng. Encyclopoedia of Law, Vol. 2, p.
762.
4. Tennery v. Pippinger, 1 Phila. 543;
Railroad v. Reeves, 11 S. W. Rep. 464.
OPINION OF COURT.

Chandler, originally intending to get
off at a certain point on the road, not yet
reached, with others on the platform,
"stood back" to allow two ladies to alight,
and then changing his mind and resolving
to get off there, followed them. As he
was in the act of stepping from the last
step, the driver struck the horses a blow
with the whip, causing them to suddenly
jump forward. In doing so, they jerked
Chandler's hand loose from the guard-rails,
and threw him violently to the ground,
Chandler had drunk an intoxicant twice
during the day, and a witness for the
defendant thought him "pretty full."
Under the instructions of the Court the
jury rendered a verdict for the defendant.
A new trial is asked on the ground of
error in these instructions.
1. The first instruction was that the
plaintiff can not recover, if (a) he was under the influence of liquor, and (b) he
was in consequence delayed in getting off,
or his caution and control of his motions
was lessened.
Being under the influence of liquor,
alone, would not prevent a recovery. It
must have induced the injury, i. e,, it

must appear that, the other circumstances
being the same, the injury would not have
happened, but for the intoxication. The
Court qualified the legal result of the
intoxication, by requiring it to have had
one of two effects, by requiring it, that
is, either to have delayed the getting off,
OR to have diminished the plaintiff's caution and control of his motions. Unfortunately, there was no evidence that
the intoxication had produced these results. Would the plaintiff not have allowed the ladies to precede him, if lie had
been sober? Would he not have determined to follow them if sober? Would
he have got from the car before it was
jerked by the whipped horses, if sober?
The evidence furnishes us no affirmative answer. Besides, the true question
is, we conceive, not whether Chandler's
caution was lessened or his dismounting
delayed by the ebriety, but whether though
drunk to the degree shown he was less cautious than an ordinarily cautious man; less
quick than an ordinarily expeditious man.
There was error we think in this instruction.
2. The jury was told that Chandler
could not recover if the accident would
not have happened to him, if he had
alighted as soon as the car stopped; that
is, giving precedence to the ladies, or,
making up his mind to alight, only after
the car had come to a stop, barred his recovery. This was plain error. When
several persons are to get off a car, on the
same side, some must precede, some follow. It cannot be laid down as law, that
for one near the step to allow those
farther off to pass him will preclude his
recovery, for an accident that would not
have happened but for this delay. Nor
can the Court say that the not forming
the intention to dismount until after a car
has stopped, will visit on the passenger all
the consequences of a supervening negligence of the carrier. No rule of law requires
a passenger even when on the platform, to
move, for the purpose of dismounting, the
instant the car stops. The second instruction, which practically involves this rule,
is erroneous.
3. The third instruction is, we think,
correct. It was not the driver's duty to
keep his eye on the rear of the car, and to
cause it to stop forever. If he had waited
a reasonable time; that is, a time reason-
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able under the actual circumstances, he
would, we think, have been justified in
concluding that all intending to get off,
had got off. If he was justified in so
thinking, he committed no imprudence in
starting the horses. But, whether he did
or did not, it was carelessness in Chandler, to get off when lie had reason to expect the car to begin to move at any instant. He should have warned the driver
that, despite the delay, be was intending
to dismount.
4. We think the 4th instruction objectionable. (a) It is ambiguous. It may mean
in the driver's usual and ordinary way.
But, the driver's usual and ordinary
way may have been a careless, reckless way. To be habitually negligent,
is no shield against the consequences
of a particular act of negligence. (b)
This ambiguity eliminated, if the point
meant that, if the injury happened,
while the driver was acting as drivers of
such vehicles under similar circumstances
ordinarily and usually act, we think it
would have been substantially correct, for
the ordinary and usual conduct of drivers
in such business is the norm of prudence
and reasonableness. Britton v. Street
Railway Co., of Grand Rapids, 90 Mich.,
159.
For the errors indicated, the rule for a
new trial must be made absolute.

BINDS vs. ANDREW G. CURTIN.
ElnIuND L. RYAN and HUGH R. MiLLER for the plaintiff.
Commencing an action in which the
process is not served will not have the
effect of arresting the running of the
Statute of Limitations unless an alias
summons be issued and served within six
years thereafter. -Curcier's Estate, 28 Pa.
261; 2 T. & H. Practice, p. 1630.
As a general rule, Statutes of Limitation
do not run against any claim while in litigation.-13 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 745.
An almost universal statutory exception
to the operation of the Statute of Limitations makes the defendant's absence from
the country, or from the state where the
cause of action accrues, postpone the running of the Statute until his return, and
even trivial absences of a few days or
weeks are sufficient.-Fowler v. Hunt, 10
Johns, 464; Randall v. Wilkins, 4 Denio,
577.
H. W. SAVIDGE and WILLIs E. M JACKEY
for the defendant.

This suit is not a continuance of the for-

mer suit, but a new suit, and therefore
the right of the plaintiff to recover is barred by the Statute of Limitations.-Magaw v. Clark, 6 Watts 528; Work v. Work,
14 Pa. 318.
To save the right of recovery under the
Statute of Limitations the plaintiff must
show that the ease has been continued and
that the court has, from time to time,
kept the original suit alive.-Penrose v.
Hart, 1 Dallas 378; Vincent v. Lessee of
Huff, 8 S. &. R. 380; Jones v. Orum, 5
Rawle 254.
Since the writ was issued against A. G.
Curtin, Harry Curtin, James Curtin and
Austin Curtin, trading as Curtin & Co.,
and the return of the sheriff was " Nihil
J1rabet" as to A. G. Curtin, and latterly a new writ was issued against the
defendant, it is not a continuance of the
former suit, and the claim is therefore
barred by528.
the Statute.-Magaw v. Clark,
6 Watts
OPINION OF COURT.

An action against A. G. Curtin and
three others to No. 2.53 Jan. Term 1894,
was begun 17th Jan., 1894, on a note for
$.500 payable Jan. 21st, 1888. As to A.
G. Curtin, the summons was returned
"nihil babel ;" as to two others, "served,"
and as to a fourth " the other defendant
James Curtin, being dead." Nothing
further was done in this action.
In September, 1896, a suit entitled,
"John Hinds v. Andrew G. Curtin, who
was impleaded with Austin Curtin, James
Curtin, Harry Curtin, and trading as
Curtin & Co., to 253, Jan. T. 1894, and
filed to No. 35, Nov. T. 1896," was begun.
The praecipe was of this form: "Issue
summons in Assumpsit, returnable first
Ionday in October, 1896." Upon this
a stmmons was issued in the ordinary
form without the alias clause.
Andrew G. Curt-in, served with the
summons, has appeared, and filed an
affidavit of defence in which he alleges the
lapse of more than six years between the
time when the note sued on became payable and the issue of the summons in Sept.
1896. The plaintiff moves for judgment
for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence.
We are therefore to determine whether
the affidavit is sufficient.
If the summons of Sept. 1896, is to be regarded as the commencement of the action,
over eight and one-half years had elapsed
since the note became payable. The
statute would prima.faciebar it.
To elude this bar the plaintiff contends
that the second summons was simply a.
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step in the action begun in 1894, adopted
to call in A. G. Curtin on whom in 1894 the
sheriff failed to make a service. Could
this contention be allowed, the result deduced from it would follow. "IWhen the
firstwrit is returned nihil habet or non
est inventus, the action may be continued
by the issue of an alias,or, after an alias,
by a pluries writ; or after the quashing
of the alias for some irregularity, by a
second alias." Trickett on Limitations,
178. The alidis is an instrument for-bringing the defendant not served into court
to answer in the original suit, and the
statute of limitations will not run. Ibid.
McClurg v. Fryer, 150 Pa. 293. Analogously, the lien of a judgment can be kept
alive beyond five years, by an alias scire
facias issued after the expiration of that
term, if an original was issued before such
expiration; 1 Trickett Liens, 219; 3 Id.
233. What we have to consider is,
whether the summons of September 1896
may be regarded as an alias. ( For an
account of alias writs. See 1 Bright Practice, 262.)
Normally the alias phrase should occur
in it. It does not. This, however, is not
indispensable. Davidson v. Thornton, 7
Pa. 128. There should nevertheless be on
the record some evidence that it is connected in the purpose of the plaintiff with
the original summons. Is there any such
note on the record? The second action
unlike Reynold's Appeal, 5 W. N. C. 184, is
brought to a new number and term as
was done apparently in Davidson v.
Thornton, 7 Pa. 128; (See Myers v. Noll,
84 Pa. 369). Thepraecipe and summons
give no intimation that any previous
action had been brought. The title of the
second action, however, names A. G. Curtin, alone, defendant, stating that he
has been impleaded with three others, to
No. 253, Jan. T. 1894. We think this allusion to the action of 1894, is sufficient
coupled with the identity of the parties,
and of the cause of action and with the
circumstance that the return to the summons of 1894, explains why Andrew G.
Curtin should be alone named in that of
1896, to indicate that the action of 1896
was designed to be a mere prolongation of
that of 1894. The only defendant named
in the second action is Andrew G. Curtin,
In this respect the plaintiff seems to
have he ededthe suggestion of the court in

Reynold's Appeal, 5 W. N. C. 184, where
it is said, of an alias scire facias on a
judgment against two defendants, Kyle
and Fox, on one of whom, Fox, there had
been no service (nor its equivalent)of the
original scire facias. "Properly the alias
scire facias should have issued against
Fox alone, keeping up the continuances,"
etc.
As we think it sufficiently appears that
the summons of Sept. 1896, was intended
to be a step towards consummating the
action, begun in 1894, and not the inception of an independent action, we conclude
that the statute of limitations does not
furnish a defence. As the defendant's
affidavit neither denies the execution of
the note, nor alleges matters in discharge
of it, other than the mere lapse of time,
the rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence is made absolute.
ESTATE OF SARAH BROWN.
Sarah Brown, wife of John, ordered
groceries, meat, flour and other provisions
for the house for a period of seven months
paying for them the sum of -$217 out of
her own estate, her husband having none.
She died at the end of this period, and, in
the settlement of her estatein the 0. Court,
the undertaker presented a bill for $75,
and the physician another for $30. These
were allowed. The balance of her estate
was $924. There survived her, her husband
John, and a son Thomas, and three daughters, Ellen, Sarah and Elizabeth. The
auditor appointed to distribute the estate,
allotted to the husband $308.
Exceptions to auditor's report.
THos. K. LEIDY and ALFRED JOEL
FEIGHT for the exceptant.
The $308 allotted to the husband, John
Brown, by the auditors is not a correct
and legal distribution according to the intestate laws of Pennsylvania.-Act of Apr.
11th 1848, P. & L. Dig., 2410.

John Brown is liable for the expenses

incurred during his wife's last illness and
for the funeral, which amounts should be
paid from his distributive share of her
estate.-Sawtelle's Appeal, 84 Pa. 306;
Waesch's Estate, 166 Pa. 204; Darmody's
Estate, 6 W. N. C. 487; Estate of Bridget
Costigan, 13 Phila. 264.
The husband of the deceased is liable to
the estate of his wife for the amount exp ended by her for the necessaries furnished
during her lifetime, she not having intended them as a gift. and the amount
should therefore be dedicted from his distributive share.-Weber's Estate, 25 W.
N. C. 220; Williams v. Coward, 1 Grant,
22- Bear's Estate, 60 Pa. 430; Colgan's Estate, 160 Pa. 140.
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CHAS. W. HAMILTON and JoHN H.
WILLIAMS for the auditor's report, cited:
Park v. Kleeber, 37 Pa. 251; Bair v. Robinson, 108 Pa. 247; Hoff v. Kaerper, 103 Pa.
396; Sawtelle's Appeal, 84 Pa. 306; Bear's
Estate, 60 Pa. 430; Moore v. Copley, 165 Pa.
297: McCormick v. Batterf, 155 Pa. 331;
Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 17 Pa. C. C. 635; Scott's
Estate, 15 Pa. C. C. 316.
OPINION OF COURT.

Sarah Brown's estate is undergoing distribution in the Orphan's Court, after her
death. The undertaker presents a bill for
$75, and the physician another for $30. It
also appears that Sarah Brown during 7
months prior to her death had bought
groceries, meat, flour and other provisions
for the family paying therefor, out of her
own estate $217. The estate left for distribution is $924 -1- $105 or $1,029. Surviving
Sarah Brown, are her husband John, ason
Thomas, and three daughters, Ellen, Sarah
and Elizabeth. The auditor has paid the
undertaker and the physician out of the
fund, and giving to the husband one-third
of the balance of $924, has divided the
other two-thirds equally among the four
children.
It seems to be conceded by the counsel
interested in supporting the distribution
that the auditor has committed an error
in awarding to the husband one-third of
the estate. He is entitled only to a child's
share. As there are four children, he
should have received, as each of them,
but one-fifth. Act April lth, 1848, 2 P. &
L. 2910.
The wife spent $217 for necessaries during the last seven months of her life. It
is unnecessary to cite authorities for the
principle that it is the duty of the husband
to supply such necessaries. He did not do
so. She did. We have no evidence of the
intent with which she thus supplied them,
as respects constituting her husband her
debtor. If she intended them as a gratuity
to him, she could not afterwards transform
herself into a creditor. But, from the bare
fact that she furnished the necessaries, are
we to infer the intention to give them?
We think not. She paid for them, and by
so doing, discharged his obligation to the
vendors of them. But she was not a mere
volunteer. She was compelled to procure
them or both suffer, herself and see her
family suffer, hunger. Her act is sufficiently. explained without the hypothesis of a gratuity. Cf. Hamill's Appeal

88 Pa. 363; Bergey's Appeal, 60 Pa. 408;
Wormley's Estate, 27 V. N. C. 13. She is
then his creditor.
That a debt of a distributee of the estate
of a deceased creditor will be set off against
his share; is recognized by frequent decisions in this state. Darmody's Estate, 13
Phila. 207; Weber's Estate, 20 Phila. 8; 25
W. N. C. 220; Waesch's Estate, 166 Pa.
204. The auditor has therefore erred in
not deducting the husband's debt to his
wife from the share awarded to him from
her estate.
The physician's and undertaker's bills
have been allowed by the auditor out of
the estate. In this we think there was
error. The fact to warrant the allegation
that the wife was liable for them does not
appear, Act April 11th, 1848, 2 P. & L.
Dig. 2907. It is the husband's duty to
procure a physician's services, and to bury
his deceased wife. There is no evidence
that the former was rendered on her request and credit, nor the latter on the request and credit of her administrator.
Fenstermacher v. Xander, 116 Pa. 41; Hoff
v. Koerper, 103 Pa. 396. Sawtelle's Appeal,
84 Pa. 306; Berger v. Clark, 79 Pa. 340.
Waesch's Estate does not change the law
in this respect.
The report of the auditor must be rectified thus:
Balance shown by him ......... $924
Add $217
105
322
Corrected balance ................. $1246
One-fifth ...................................... $249.20
Dividend to Thomas Brown ......... 249.20
"
" Ellen Brown ............. 249.20
99
" Sarah Brown ............. 249.20
"
" Elizabeth Brown ......
249.20
" John Brown ............
husband
$249.20
217.00
32.20

ESTATE OF REBECCA SAILF, A
MINOR.
Exceptions by Ward.
Amos Isett was appointed guardian of
Rebecca; Saile on Oct. 3d, 1890, and, as
such received, as her estate, $13,000. Isett
and John Anderson were carrying on the
business of making domestic furniture.
They had invested in this business, each,
the sum of $19,000. They spent $10,000 in
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the purchase of the factory, and $8000 in the
purchase of machinery. The other $20,000
they employed in the purchase of materials, the payment of labor, etc. Rebecca
Saile reached her majority on July 6, 1894.
Isett, with the knowledge and consent of
his partner employed the$13,000 of his ward
in the business, which was correspondingly
increased in volume, by the purchase of
a larger quantity of material than theretofore and the production therefrom of a
correspondingly larger quantity of furniture. Both Isett and Anderson gave
their entire attention and skill to the
business, and the services of each
would have been worth $1,500 per year.
The net profits of the business between Oct. 3rd, 1890, and July 6th, 1894,
were $28,000; each of the partners drawing
out each year, one-half of the profits of
that year. The profits of all the years were
substantially equal,
On the ward's attaining majority, Isett
filed an account, in which he charged himself with the $13,000, and as interest with
the sum of $780 per year, compounded.
The ward excepted to the account, on
the ground that she was entitled to thirteen-fifty-firsts of the profits, assumed to
be $28,000.
I. I. WINGERT and R. W. IRVING for
exceptant.
The ward has a right to elect either the
profits or the interests of her money.Robinett's Appeal, 36 Pa. 174; Seguin's
Appeal, 103 Pa. 139; Small's Estate, 144
Pa. 293.
The guardian having employed his
ward's funds in his own business, should
not be allowed commission on the fund.Seguin's Appeal, supra.
Where trust money is used in a partnership business, one of the partners being
trustee, and with knowledge of the other
partners, the partnership is placed, at the
election of the cestui que trust, in the
position of trustee. -Vyse v. Foster, 7 H.
L. 318; Trull v. Trull, 13 Allen 407; GuilIon v. Peterson, 89 Pa. 163; Dale v. Fulton,
9 Cowen, 308.
The guardian is as much liable for the
entire amount of the profits, as for the entire amount of the principal.
BLAKE IRwIN and R. H. BARKER for
guardian.
The ward is entitled only to such profits as are attributable to the employment
of her capital, and not such as are attributable to skill, etc.-Seguin's Appeal, 103
Pa. 139; Robinett's Appeal, 36 Pa. 174.
Levin on Trusts, 278; Bond v. Lockwood,
33 lI. 44.
Where a guardian puts his ward's funds
into a business of his firm, he is liable
for such profits, only, as he actually received therefrom.-Seguin's Appeal, sup)ra; Small's Estate, 144 Pa. 311; Kyle v.
Barnett, 17 Ala. 306; indley on Partnership, 523.

OPINION OF COURT.

$13,000, the estate of Rebecca Saile,
minor, came to the hands of Amos Isett
as her guardian. In a business in which
already $38,000 were invested, and which
Isett and Anderson conducted as partners,
Isett employed this $13,000 for the period
of three years and nine months. During
this period, the net profits of the business,
after allowing $1,500 per annum to each of
the partners were $28,000. Rebecca Salle
having attained majority, Isett has filed
his guardian's account, in which he
charges himself with the $13,000 and with
$780 annual interest, compounded. Rebecca Saile insists that she is entitled to
thirteen-fifty-first's of the profits.
That she has a right to elect either the
profits or the interests, is beydnd question.
Robinett's Appeal, 36 Pa. 174; Seguin's
Appeal, 103 Pa. 139; Small's Estate, 144
Pa. 293.
The only disputable questions concern
the mode of computing the profits, and
the liability of Isett for that part of the
profits earned by the $13,000, which has
been each year taken out by Anderson.
1. As-to the mode of computing the
profits.
May the partners deduct the fair compensation for their skill and attention to
the business? The profits are not earned
by the capital alone. Without it, doubtless, they would not have been realized,
but neither would they have been, but for
the enterprise, skill and industry of the
partners. Both are concurrent factors. It
is therefore but proper that the price of
this enterprise, skill, etc., should be deducted from the profits, as charges upon
their production. Small's Estate, 144 Pa.
293; Seguin's Appeal, 103 Pa. 139.
Deduction made, for the service of the
partners, what remains must be considered
as the product of the capital. As, of the
capital employed, thirteen-fifty-firsts belonged to the ward, it would seem indisputable that she should receive thirteenfifty-firsts of the profits.
It happens, however, that one-half of
the entire profits, and therefore one-half
of that part earned by Rebecca Saile's
money, has been paid over to Anderson,
the guardian's partner. Is the guardian
responsible for this? It is difficult to
understand why he should discharge
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his liability by permitting his partner to take half. If the partner had
taken half of the $13,000, Isett would have
remained liable for it. The earnings of
the $13,000 as much belong, if she elects to
claim them, to Rebecca Salle as the $13,000. We find it, however, impossible to
escape the authority ofSeguin's Appeal, 103
Pa. 139, which seems to be an express decision. It is to be regretted that neither
the auditing Judge, Penrose, nor the
writer of the opinion of the Supreme Court,
justifies the decision by suggestion or
argument. The court below has evidently referred to trans-Atlantic decisions, and to Lindley on Partnerships.
The Supreme Court does not explicitly allude to the question.
We shall imitate Judge Penrose, and
bow to the decisions of the English Courts;
and the more readily since they have received the tacit approval of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.
Rebecca Saile will therefore be entitled
to the profits on one-half of the $13,000;
that is to 13-102 of the entire profits earned
during the interval between October 3rd,
1890, and July 6th, 1894.
JOHN SCLAFFNER vs. THOMAS
KIRKBRIDE.
IN EQUITY.

Schaffner, a laborer, employed by a R.
R. extending into Va., is indebted to
Kirkbride in the sum of $100. Kirkbride,
for the purpose of evading the operation
of the 5th section of the act of 1845, which
declares that the wages of any laborer, or
the salary of any person in public or private employment, shall not be liable to attachment in the hands of the employer,
goes into Virginia and begins an attachment proceeding, in which he summons
the R. R. Co. as garnishee. Schaffimer
is, at the inception of the attachment
proceeding, and still is a citizen of Penna.
Kirkbride, who was a citizen of Maryland
when he instituted the attachment, has
since become and at the filing of the bill
is a citizen of Penna. The bill prays the
court to enjoin the defendant from prosecuting the attachment proceeding.
Demurrer to the bill, alleging (a) a want
of jurisdiction in the court; (b) no equity
disclosed in the bill.
GEo. T. BROWN AND JOHN E. SMALL
for the defendant.
(1.) Non-residents have all the privileges, in a transitory action, of our own
citizens.-Constitution of U. S., Art. 4,

Sec. 2; Steele v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447;
Chase v. Ninth Nat. Bk. of N. Y., 56 Pa.
355; Darlington v. Rogers, 13 Phila. 102.
Wages of labor earned and due to a citizen of this state may be attached for a delt
due in another state.-Morgan v. Neville,
74 Pa. 52; Shollenberg v. Ins. Co., 5 W. N.
C. 405, Bolton v. Penna. R. R. Co., 88 Pa.
261.
The power of quashing a proceeding of
a sister state should be confined to proceedings that are irregular, defective or
improper.-Steel v. Goodwin, 113 Pa. 288.
Equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the
defendant's action in Virginia.-Fallon v.
Remington, 10 W. N. 0. 119; Lorenz v.
Wrightman, 44 Pa. 27; Loomis v. Loomis,
27 Pa. 233; Connoyer v. Schaeffer, 89 U. S.
260.
(2.) There is not such abuse of legal process, nor mistake, nor fraud as that a court
of equity will relieve. The principle of
law involved in this case is analogous to
that of Bolton v. Penna. R. R. Co., 88
Pa. 261; Morgan v. Neville, 74 Pa. 56.
The laws of Penna., at the commencement of the attachment proceedings, did
not apply to the defendant. Becoming a
citizen of Penna. after commencing the
action will not make him amenable to its
laws for acts done by him before acquiring
citizenship here.
JOSEPH F. BIDDLE AND H. FRANKLIN
KANTNER

for the complainant.

(1.) As to jurisdiction. - Courts of
Equity, upon a proper case being made,
have authority to restrain persons within
their jurisdictions from prosecuting suits
either in the courts of the state to which
they belong, or in other states, or in foreign
countries, acting in personam upon the
parties sought to be enjoined and directing
them to proceed no further in such suits.High on Injunctions, . 60; Story on Equity
899-900; Vail v. Knapp,
Jurisprudence,
49 Barb. 299; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen 545;
Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio, 516; Wilson v.
Joseph, 107 Ind. 490; Keyser v. Rice, 47
Md. 203; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S.
107; Sweeny v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 363.
(2.) As to equity.-It is against equity
for a creditor to evade the laws of his own
state in order to obtain a preference over
other creditors, or work injustice to his
debtor, because such action, would be a
fraud upon the law.-Beach on Injunctions, 412; Banks v. R. & B. R. R. Co.,
28 Vt. 476; Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio 516;
Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen 545; Keyser v.
Rice, 47 Md. 203; Sweeny v. Hunter, 14.5
Pa. 363; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S.
107.
,2, Constitution of the U.
Article IV
S. would not be infringed by the restraining of the defendant since the attachment
proceedings have not been prosecuted to
judgment.
OPINION OF COURT.

Kirkbride, a citizen of Maryland, was a
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creditor of Schaffner, a citizen of Pennsylvania. He began an attachment in Virginia, of wages due Schaffner by a railroad corpoiation. Subsequently, before the
conclusion of the attachment proceedings,
he became, and has ever since remained, a
citizen of Pennsylvania. Upon his becoming such citizen, and before the completion of the attachment proceedings in
Va. by judgment, Schaffner files this bill
to restrain Kirkbride from the further prosecution of the Virginia attachment.
The defendant. demurs, for want of
jurisdiction, and for want of equity.
Restraint of proceedings at law, is not
an unusual object of injunctions issued by
courts of equity. Nor, is the circumstance
that the litigation is taking, or is to take,
place in the forum of another state or country, a bar to the exercise of this power. The
injunction not being directed to the court,
but to the party, at whose instance alone
the court acts, the issue of such injunction
is no assertion of extra-territorial power,
by the chancellor. Cole v. Cunningham,
133 U. S. 107; Cunningham v. Butler [same
case] 142 Mass. 47; Snook v. Snetzer, 25
Ohio St. 516; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203.
The defendant was, at the service of the
subpoena, within the jurisdiction of the
Court. Proper service has been had upon
him. If there be defect of jurisdiction,
therefore, it does not consist in omission of
the conditions on which the court acquires
control of the person of a defendant.
The two reasons assigned for the demurrer, want of jurisdiction and want of
equity, must be deemed one. If no equity
is shown in the bill, of course a chancellor
has no jurisdiction. If the bill discloses
facts out of which an equitable right
emerges, then, we think, there can be no
doubt of the jurisdiction. We are then to
inquire whether the bill does disclose an
equity.
The right alleged by the plaintiff is, if it
exists, created by- the proviso to the 5th
section of the act of 1845 which ordains
that "the wages of any laborer or the
salary of any person in public or private
employment, shall not be liable to attachment in the hands of the employer." I
Bright. Dig. 836; pl. 49; ] P. & L. Dig. 1643;
pl. 63. The act of 1836 had given the
creditor the power to attach debts. The
proviso of Sec. 5, act of 1845 simply exempts wages from the attachableness to

which, by the act of 1836, they were exposed. The right to exemption from attachment is created by law. Attachment
itself is a creature of law. It exists only
within the limits prescribed by the law.
Wages are beyond these limits. It would
be unnecessary to appeal to equity to protect non-attachable property from seizure
by attachment. The garnishee would not
be protected by the attachment in paying
the debt of his employee out of his wages,
but would have to pay them over again to
him. An action at law would coerce this
payment, should coercion become necessary. If any equity exists on the part of
the plaintiff it is (1) because the law of
Pennsylvania, either explicitly or implicitly, confers on him a right to non-attachment of his wages even beyond Pennsylvania, and (2) because courts of law do
not offer the appropriate remedy to protect
this right; i. e. beyond Pennsylvania.
(1.) That there is a right to non-attachment beyond Pennsylvania by non-Pennsylvanians can hardly be pretended. To
assert it, would be to give Pennsylvania
the power to regulate remedies in other
jurisdictions. The question is narrower.
It is, does the policy of Pennsylvania to
exempt wages from attachment, impose a
duty on Pennsylvanians to respect this
policy so far as to abstain from attaching
in other states the wages of Pennsylvanians in which states such attachment is permissible? We think we must
answer this question affirmatively. An
analbgous right has been recognized in
Maryland, in Indiana, and in Ohio. A
not remotely similar right has been recognized in Massachusetts, where it has been
held that the policy of the state being to
secure an equal distribution of an insolvent's assets among his creditors, a citizen
of the state may not prevent this result by
attaching property of the debtor lying in
another state, Cunningham v. Butler, 142
Mass. 47, S. C. Cole v. Cunningham 133
U. S. 107, Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
by comity even assisted Virginia to effectuate this policy by preventing aVirginian
from successfully attaching (foreign attachment) a debt in Pennsylvania due to
an insolvent Virginia corporation, for
whose assets a receiver had been appointed in Virginia. Bagby v. Atlan. Miss. &
Ohio R. R. Co., 86 Pa. 291. Such a right
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is recognized by C. J. Sterrett, in a dictum in Sweeny v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 363,372,
and the act of May 23, 1887 P. L. 164, there
considered, is a legislative assertion of a
similar right.
(2.) It remains to consider whether the
right is legal or equitable? Most of the
cases that have treated it as a right, have
also treated it as one to be defended by injunction. Thus the right of all creditors
of an insolvent to share equally in his assets, as well those in other states, as in
that of his domicile, as against citizens of
the state of the domicile was protected by
injunction in Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen
545; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107;
Cunningham v. Butler, 142 Mass. 47. The
right of a wage earner to have his wages
exempted from levy or attachment, even
beyond the state of his domicile, by a fellow citizen in his domicile, was also protected by injunction, in Wilson v. Joseph
107 Ind. 490; Snook v. Snetzer 25 Oh. St.
516; Keyser v. Rice 47 Md. 203. Sterrett C.
J. thinks this a proper object to be
achieved by injunction; Sweeny v. Hunter, supra.
Had a judgment been recovered in the
attachment proceeding, possibly a new
principle would have intervened, that requiring full faith and credit to be given in
onestateto the judgment of another; Green
v. Buskirk, 5 Wall 307; Lawrence v. Batcheller, 131 MNass. 504. (See remarks on those
cases in 142 Mass. 47 supra.) (With these
cases stand Morgan v. Neville, 74 Pa.
52; Bolton v. Pa. Co., 88 Pa. 261, in
which the garnishee having paid the
wages to the attaching creditor of the
employee after judgment against him
in another state, he was not compelled
to pay the wages again to the employee.)
In the case before us, Kirkbride had not
recovered a judgment when the injunction
bill was filed and served.
There is one important incident, however, in which the case before us differs
from all the reported cases we have discovered. The theory of these cases is that
the citizens of a state are bound not to circumvent its policy by going to other jurisdictions and taking advantage of laws
therein variant from those of the domicife. It appears that Kirkbride was, when
he began his attachment, not a citizen of
this state. How then was he under any
duty to assist this state in the pursuit of

any particular policy? He did not reside
here. He did not seek the aid of our
courts. He found the property of his
debtor [in a sense] in Virginia. He attached it there. Surely, he was guilty of
no offense against Pennsylvania in doing
this. The most extreme extra-territorialist will hardly contend that Pennsylvania
can give immunity to its citizens, if debtors, as against creditors owing it no allegiance, and seeking the aid of foreign
courts.
It was said at the hearing, that Kirkbride violated the spirit of the law of his
own state, Maryland, in attaching the
wages. But, (i) we have no evidence of
the Maryland law; (2) the Maryland law
would be strangely liberal, if its policy was
to exempt non-farjlandersfrom attachments in other states, of wages, by Maryland creditors. (3) A Pennsylvania court
of equity will hardly enforce on a Pennsylvanian, who was once a Marylander, a
Maryland policy.
Did the coming of Kirkbride into Pennsylvania, make wrong what had been
right? Hardly. Did it make wrong, the
prosecution of the remedy which he was
right in instituting? We cannot persuade
ourselves that it did. We are unwilling
to give an unprecedented extension to the
so-called equity, created in recent years,
which the bill invokes.
For this reason, we must sustain the demurrer and dismiss the bill.
JOHN OLIVER vs. HENRY BUDD.
Oliver leased by parol to Budd, for three
years, a house and lot, and agreed at the
same time that Budd might remain over
for a second period of three years. This
privilege Budd exercised, and he remained
in possession during the whole of the second period of three years. Nor did he
then give up the possession, but continued
to hold the premises from the 1st of April,
1893, the term having expired the preceding day, until June 29. 1893. He then
withdrew from them, giving the key to
Oliver, who declined to excuse him from
paying rent for the period of three years,
commencing with April 1, 1893, contending that, having held over after a three
year's term, he had in effect relet the
premises for another period of three years.
On the other hand, Budd alleged that he
was bound to pay only such part of a year's
rent as would be proportional to that portion of the year in which he bad retained
possession.
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J. P. COSTELLO and A. SHOENER for

plaintiff.

The parol lease was valid- Statute of
Frauds, 1 P. & L. Dig. 2191; Yennings v.
McComb, 112 Pa. 518.
A surrender by tenant during the term
does not relieve him from rent unless accepted by the landlord. Auer v. Penn, 99
Pa.'370; Boyle v. Teller, 132 Pa. 56; Breuckman v. Twibill, 89 Pa. 58; Kiester Y. Miller, 25 Pa. 481.
Notice by tenant of intent to vacate,
not followed by vacation, will not relieve
him. McBrier v. Marshall, 126 Pa. 390.
Graham v. Dempsey, 169 Pa. 460.
Remaining over the first three years
created a new term of three years. Hollis
v. Burns, 100 Pa. 206; Nesbit v. Godfrey,
155 Pa. 2.51; Harding v. Seeley, 148 Pa. 20.
JONATHAN R. SMITH and A. A. WINGERT for defendant.
Tenancy expiring on a day certain, notice to quit is unnecessary. Bedford v.
McElherron, 2 S. & R. 49; Logan v. Herron, 8 S. & R. 459; Evans v. Hastings, 9
Pa. 273; 2 B1. Com. 147.
A tenant for years holding over, after
notice to quit is a trespasser, or, at the
election of landlord, tenant at will. Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Pa. 144; Boggs v. Black, 1
Binn., 332; Overdeer v. Lewis, 1 W. & S.
90; or tenant from year to year, subject to
all relevant covenants of lease; Laguerenne v. Dougerty, 35 Pa. 45; Harvey v.
Gunzber, 148 Pa. 294; Williams v. Ladew, 17]'Pa, 369; 2 Bi. Com. 144; 4 Kent,
Corn. 144.
Until notice to quit, tenant not a trespasser. Commonwealth v. Knarr, 135 Pa
35; Phoenixville Borough v. Walters, 147
Pa. 501.
Tenants at sufferance are not liable for
use and occupation. Cruise, ch. 2; 4 Kent
117; Flood v. Flood, 1 Allen 217; Delano v.
Montague, 4 Cush. 42; Featherstonhaugh
v. Bradshaw, 1 Wend. 134. Contra,Bush
v. Nat. Oil Refining Co. 5 W. N. C. 143
See Hollis v. Burns, 100 Pa. 206; Taylor,
Landlord & Tenant, Par. 57; 6 Rights,
Rem. & Pr. 4680, 4569, 4677.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The parol lease by Oliver to Budd was
for three years, and included an agreement that Budd might remain over for a
second period of three years. The interest therefore, which Budd acquired in the
house and lot, if this contract was valid,
was for more than three years. In Hand
v. Ball, 2 Exch. Division 318 (1876) the
lease was for a certain term" with right at
the end of that term, for the tenant, by
a month's previous notice, to remain on for
three years and a half more."
Cleasby
B. said "We cannot consider this as a
lease not exceeding three years, A lease

not exceeding thiee years, in our opinion,
must be a lease not giving a right (independent of the lessor) exceeding three
years. We think a demise for three years,
and for three years longer, at the option
of the lessee, could not be said to be a
lease not exceeding three years, and would
not be valid if by parol only." The same
principle is applied in Schmitz v. Lauferty,
29 Ind. 400. We think it sound.
Oliver's lease to Budd, was therefore
within the statute of frauds. It became
by Budd's retention of possession and Oliver's acceptance of rent a tenancy from year
to year. Dumn v. Rothermel, 112 Pa.
272; Jennings v. McComb, 112 Pa. 518;
Whiting v. Opera House 88, Pa. 100; Stover v. Cadwalfader, 2 Penny 117. 1 Act
March 21st, 1772. 1 P. & L. Dig. 2191. As
the possession began on the 1st of April,
1887, Budd became, as tenant, entitled to
possession until April 1, 1888, with the
right to hold over another year, unless
he was notified three months in advance
by Oliver to retire. When, on April 1,
1893, Budd, not having been notified to
yield up the premises, continued to possess
them, he acquired a right to retain the
possession until April 1, 1894. Could he
however, by surrendering the possession
duringthe year, escape the payment of
the rent that would accrue between such
surrender and the termination of the year?
We think not. As, against the landlord,
he can retain the premises for a year, so
as against him, the landlord can deinand the rent for the year. Compare
Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Pa. 144; Phillips
v. Monges, 4 Wh. 22.5; Hollis v. Burns, 100
Pa. 206; Phoenixville Borough v. Walters,
147 Pa. 501. To permit the tenant to hold
the premises for a year or not at his own
caprice, would be an injustice to the lessor
which the law would be reluctant to inflict.
Had the lease been valid under the statute of frauds, the interesting question
would have presented itself whether a
holding over by the tenant without express agreement would have been, if the
lessor so willed, an implied repetition of
the lease for three years. McBrier v. Marshall, 126 Pa. 390;'Phoenixville Borough
v. Walters, 147 Pa. 501; do not answer it.
We think, however, it would have been
no more than a renewal of the terms of the
lease for one year.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover the
rent for the year on which the defendant
had entered, but not for the two following
years,
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Wilbur F. Sadler, a native of Cumberland
County, Pa., after completing his scholastic traitiig, and reading law for tile prescribed time,
was admitted to the bar of Cumberland in 1864.
During the next twenty years he acquired ote of
tle largest and most lucrative practices ever enjoyed at that bar. In 1884, he was elected judge of
the several courts of the 9th Judicial District. His
term expiring in 1894, he returned to the practice of
the law. In two Republican State Conventions, he
received large support for nomination to the Suprente Court. He was one of the projectors of the
Dickinson School of Law, and sittce 1891, has been
Professor of the Law of Corporations and Practice
iu that institution.

